Files
tunnel/AGENTS.md
T
TZGyn 437a2e447e Issue real certificates via ACME DNS-01
Tunnels now get a per-tunnel certificate from the configured ACME CA
(Let's Encrypt by default) with DNS-01 through Porkbun, keeping the
client's CSR and key. Issuance is asynchronous (issuing/ready/failed);
the account persists in the store, renewals run in a 30-day window with
retries, and a failed renewal keeps the old certificate serving.
Switching from the local CA reissues existing tunnels automatically,
and the admin dashboard shows the issuer and certificate state.

Verified against Pebble and Let's Encrypt staging.
2026-10-25 23:33:52 +08:00

8.6 KiB

AGENTS.md

Single-node, self-hosted OpenTunnel-compatible server in Go. The wire protocol and API contract are the reference's, not ours to invent:

  • Source of truth: .reference/opentunnel/docs/protocol.md
  • API contract: .reference/opentunnel/crates/opentunnel-server/tests/fixtures/worker-contract.json (paths, status codes, bodies, JSON key order — installed clients depend on it)
  • Conformance vectors: .reference/opentunnel/spec/vectors/*.json, run by internal/server/*_test.go (the reference checkout must exist; tests skip otherwise)

.reference/ is untracked research input (see .reference/opentunnel.md for what we take vs. skip). Never vendor it into the build.

Layout

  • cmd/tunneld — flags/env wiring, listeners, signal handling
  • internal/server/proto.go — wire types (pinned JSON key order), IDs/tokens (same generation as the reference: 12-char base32 slugs, rly_ tokens, hex SHA-256 token hashes), route validation, data frames
  • internal/server/clienthello.go — TLS ClientHello parser (SNI + ALPN) that reads exact bytes only, so the connection can be replayed or forwarded
  • internal/server/localca.go — the built-in insecure CA (the reference's ISSUER=local equivalent); signs tunnel CSRs after checking CN == hostname and SANs ⊆ {hostname, *.hostname}
  • internal/server/issuer.go — the issuer interface plus the local-CA and ACME DNS-01 implementations (account persistence, order/challenge flow, propagation check, certificate for the client's CSR)
  • internal/server/dns.go, dns_porkbun.go, dns_challtestsrv.go — the challenge DNS providers: Porkbun's API for production, pebble-challtestsrv for local ACME tests
  • internal/server/renew.go — the renewal loop: 30-day window, 6-hour checks, retries, restart recovery, and local-CA → ACME migration
  • internal/server/store.go — JSON-file store (0600, atomic rename); single writer, self-hosted scale
  • internal/server/api.go — HTTP API per the contract; tunnel existence is checked before auth (404 before 401), body JSON syntax before everything
  • internal/server/bridge.go — WebSocket bridge sessions: attach, route claiming (one owner per route), heartbeats, idle retirement, visitor pumps
  • internal/server/admin.go — the admin dashboard handlers: GET /api/admin/overview (bearer ADMIN_TOKEN, 503 when unset, 401 when wrong) and the page/assets served from the embedded frontend
  • web/ — the dashboard frontend: Svelte 5 (runes) + TypeScript, Vite via bun, pure CSS, no component libraries. bun run build emits to internal/dashboard/dist (gitignored; the committed .gitkeep keeps go:embed all:dist valid, and the handler answers 503 until built). internal/dashboard embeds the output; the Dockerfile builds it in a bun stage before the Go build
  • internal/server/relay.go — public TLS listener: parses the ClientHello, terminates the domain itself, passes tunnel hostnames to bridges untouched

Commands

  • go build ./... / go vet ./... / gofmt -l . — must stay clean
  • go test ./...
  • Frontend: cd web && bun install && bun run check && bun run build — the dashboard test skips when internal/dashboard/dist has no build (only the committed .gitkeep)
  • Dev loop: go build -o .local/tunneld ./cmd/tunneld && .local/tunneld -domain localhost, then OPENTUNNEL_API=http://localhost:8080 opentunnel route add 4096 --name api with the official CLI. go build drops a binary next to the source — it is gitignored; prefer -o .local/.

Gotchas

  • Coolify deployment (verified 2026-10-25): app nokzgyrlhuuzduozr7yts4z3 in project Personal, https://tunnel.tzgyn.dev, deploy-key source on the shared gitea key, push to main auto-deploys via the Gitea webhook. Redeploy with POST /api/v1/deploy?uuid=<app> (the GET form is gone). Webhook details when debugging: Coolify's manual Gitea webhook verifies X-Hub-Signature-256 (HMAC-SHA256 hex of the raw body with the app's manual_webhook_secret_gitea; Gitea sends this header natively) and matches apps by repository.full_name against the app's git_repository after canonicalization — the :22222 port in the scp-style URL is ignored, so it matches fine. A curl replay needs X-Gitea-Event: push and the signature header, or it answers "No matching application or invalid signature." Coolify's audit log (MCP list_audit_events, source=webhook) is the debugging oracle: webhook.deployment.queued = authenticated and queued, webhook.gitea.signature_failed = the Gitea hook's secret does not match the app's current manual_webhook_secret_gitea. Gitea's hook edit API does not update the stored secret — PATCHing the hook returns 200 but deliveries keep failing signature checks; delete the hook and create a fresh one with the secret instead (current hook: id 6, branch_filter main). The app's secret is regenerated whenever the app is recreated, so recreate the hook after any app recreation. Coolify's webhook deploy pins the pushed commit (git fetch origin <sha>), and this Gitea only serves the current tip by SHA (uploadpack.allowReachableSHA1InWant is off; other SHAs fail with "not our ref"). Deploys fail if a later push lands before the fetch — re-trigger the deploy. Proper fix, inside the Gitea container: git -C /data/git/repositories/TZGyn/tunnel.git config uploadpack.allowReachableSHA1InWant true. This Coolify version stores custom_labels base64-encoded and does not merge its generated Traefik labels for API-created apps: the full label set must live in custom_labels (mirror a working app's generated format — http/https routers with certresolver=letsencrypt — plus the TCP passthrough lines). Deployment JSON from the API can break jq (invalid escapes in the logs field) — parse with python instead.

  • Deployment: the multi-stage Dockerfile builds a static non-root alpine image; verify CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" ./cmd/tunneld after changing build-affecting code (no Docker runtime on the dev machine). Tunnel visitor traffic must reach the SNI listener without TLS termination (raw TCP, or a Traefik TCP passthrough router); the API domain may sit behind a TLS-terminating proxy. On a Coolify-managed host (Traefik owns 443/80): API = app domain → container :8080 with HTTP_MODE=serve; tunnel traffic = custom Traefik TCP labels (HostSNIRegexp + tls.passthrough=true) → container :8443. See README "Deploy on Coolify".

  • ACME / Porkbun (M2): with PORKBUN_API_KEY and PORKBUN_SECRET_API_KEY set, the issuer is Let's Encrypt production and every tunnel is reissued (the old local-CA cert keeps serving until the new one is ready). The key used here is restricted to tzgyn.dev, but Porkbun also requires API access opt-in per domain; without it every DNS call fails with API_ACCESS_DISABLED. Challenge records are _acme-challenge.<id>.<domain> (one name for hostname + wildcard, up to two TXT values) and are deleted when the attempt ends. The ACME account key and URL are stored in the data file, so the persistent volume matters. Failed renewals keep the old certificate serving (state=failed, still ready on the wire) and retry every 6 hours. Use ACME_DIRECTORY_URL=https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory for tests; staging certs are untrusted. Local ACME E2E is Pebble + pebble-challtestsrv with DNS_PROVIDER=challtestsrv and ACME_CA_BUNDLE=.../test/certs/pebble.minica.pem.

  • macOS system curl (LibreSSL) does not send SNI for *.localhost names, so curl https://api.<id>.localhost:8443/ gets closed (the relay requires SNI). Test with openssl s_client -servername ... or Homebrew curl.

  • JSON key order of API bodies is contractual — always json.Marshal structs with declared field order, never maps.

  • Bridge writes go through one ordered outbox channel per session. Control messages therefore can queue behind data — a known M1 deviation from the reference's deadlock-avoidance; a stalled visitor self-heals via the client's idle timeout. Revisit with per-connection flow control.

  • The bridge WebSocket must use coder/websocket with compression disabled and the opentunnel subprotocol; read limits are 64 KiB before attach and 4+32 KiB after.

  • No third-party deps beyond github.com/coder/websocket; keep it that way unless a milestone calls for it.

  • Milestones: M1 core data path (done); M2 real ACME DNS-01 + renewals (done); M3 rate limits/admin/hardening; M4 maybe a Go client. Don't pull M2+ scope into M1 fixes, or M3 scope into M2 fixes.